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Abstract 
The paper reviews the correlation between the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 before 
and during the 2008 global financial crisis. It found that The S&P 500 has a strong 
causation effect on the FTSE 100, both before and since the financial crisis. This link 
seems to have increased after the October 2007 peak in the S&P 500. Since the crisis, 
the FTSE 100 appears to have a weak causation effect on the S&P 500. Before the 
crisis there was no apparent impact on the S&P 500’s movements from movements 
in the FTSE 100. 
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1. Introduction 
With the seeming interdependence of the global economic system it would be logical 
to assume that international financial market indices are similarly linked. The intent 
of this paper is to compare the correlation between the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 
during the five years prior to and during the financial crisis. We will review the 
correlation of these indices from October 2003 to October 2007 and compare these 
results to their correlation from November 2007 to November 2011. The reason for 
using October 2007 as the cut off between the two periods is that the S&P 500 
peaked during October 2007. Also, this paper seeks to examine whether the 
correlations between markets are visibly different before and after major market 
events, like the global financial crisis.  
 
2. Review of Previous Literature 
Previous studies have reviewed linkages between the US and foreign stock market 
indices. Arshanapalli and Doukas (2002), examined the link between the US and 
major Western European stock market indices. Their paper specifically examined the 
period before and after the October 1987 stock market crash. Their research 
displayed a lack of interdependence between the indices before the crash. However, a 
strong link was developed after the crash. This link resulted in the US indices having 
a strong impact on the indices in France, Germany, and the UK. An exception in their 
study was the apparent lack of interdependence of the Japanese equity market and the 
other sampled indices2. 
Yang et al. (2006) examined the interdependence between the US indices and the 
emerging markets of Eastern Europe. Their study examined the period preceding and 
following the 1998 Russian financial crisis. This study revealed a link between the 
US and the Eastern European indices. The US indices were found to have a strong 
corollary effect on the emerging market indices. Moreover, during the course of their 
research they found that this link was amplified during and after the 1998 Russian 
financial crisis. Their results found that “the impact of the 1997–1998 global 
emerging market crisis on emerging stock market integration, the finding of 
strengthened stock market linkages (both in the long run and the short run).”3 
3. Framework 
1. Hypotheses 
H0: The S&P 500 exerted a greater influence on the FTSE 100 
after its peak in October 2007. 
 
HA: The S&P 500 exerted the same or less influence on the FTSE 
100 after its peak in October 2007. 
                                                      
2 Arshanapalli, Bala and Doukas, John. (1993) “International stock market linkages: Evidence from the 
pre- and post-October 1987 period,” Journal of Banking & Finance 17 (February 1993): 193-208 
3 Yang, Jian; Hsiao, Cheng; Li, Qi; Wang, Zijun. (2006) “The emerging markets crisis and stock market linkages: 
further evidence,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 21 (Sept/Oct 2006) 727-744. 
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2. Testing Method 
The primary methods of testing our hypotheses will be the Granger causality test and 
variance decomposition. By utilizing the Granger causality test we will be able to 
determine the significance level of the probability that the S&P 500 influences the 
FTSE 100. Variance decomposition allows us to determine to what extent changes in 
the FTSE 100 are the result of changes in the S&P 500. Both of these testing 
methods are in line with our intention of utilizing the VAR model. 
 
4. Data Description 
SP500_old: The close of the S&P500 from 1 October, 2003 to 31 October, 2007 
adjusted for dividends and splits. 
lnSP500_old: The log of the close of the S&P500 from 1 October, 2003 to 31 
October, 2007 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
dlnSP500_old: The log difference of the close of the S&P500 from 1 October, 2003 
to 31 October, 2007 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
FTSE_old: The close of the FTSE 100 from 1 October, 2003 to 31 October, 2007 
adjusted for dividends and splits. 
lnFTSE_old: The log of the close of the FTSE 100 from 1 October, 2003 to 31 
October, 2007 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
dlnftse_old: The log difference of the close of the FTSE 100 from 1 October, 2003 
to 31 October, 2007 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
SP500_new: The close of the S&P500 from 1 November, 2007 to 30 November, 
2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
lnSP500_new: The log close of the S&P500 from 1 November, 2007 to 30 
November, 2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
dlnSP500_new: The log difference close of the S&P500 from 1 November, 2007 to 
30 November, 2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
FTSE_new: The close of the FTSE 100from 1 November, 2007 to 30 November, 
2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
lnFTSE_new: The log close of the FTSE 100 from 1 November, 2007 to 30 
November, 2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
dlnftse_new: The close of the FTSE 100 from 1 November, 2007 to 30 November, 
2011 adjusted for dividends and splits. 
 
All data was downloaded from Yahoo! Finance. Figures 1.1 and 1.2 reveal the 
movements of the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 together over the two different times 
periods: 1) 1 October, 2003 to 31 October, 2007 and 2) 1 November, 2007 to 30 
November, 2007. For the purposes of the paper, all data sets ending in “old” are for 
the time period 1 October, 2003 to 31 October, 2007. All data sets ending in “new” 
are for the time period 1 November, 2007 to 30 November, 2011.  
 
The adjusted close for the FTSE 100 was collected over the sample period and the 
S&P 500 was matched for the correlated period. Days when one or both markets 
were closed were not included in the sample. Days when one or both of the markets 
were open for only half-days were included due to the cost to benefit of excluding 
them. It is assumed that these minor time differences do not significantly affect the 
overall results of the paper.  
3
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Figure 1.1 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
 
5. Specification of the Model 
 
1. Basic Model 
Due to the goal of the paper and the format of the data we will seek to find the 
correlation of the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 from 5 years up until the S&P 500’s peak 
in October 2007 and the 5 years since that peak. The VAR model will be utilized to 
find these correlations. 
 
2. Unit root and cointegration test 
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The variables are all time series. Thus, the unit root test must be conducted. The unit 
root test will reveal whether or not the time series are stationary and the existence of 
a unit root in the residual will reveal that we must utilize the VAR model.  
 
From the below table we can see that neither the S&P 500 nor the FTSE 100 from 
2003 to 2007 have unit roots and thus are non-stationary series. Since the S&P 500 
and FTSE 100 have no unit roots a test for cointegration of the residual is 
unnecessary. You can see from the graph that the indices were fairly uniformly 
increasing and therefore were not stationary. 
 
Variable ADF-test 5%--CV Conclusion
ln(SP500_old) -3.867214 -3.414269 I(0) 
ln(ftse_old) -3.668086 -3.414273 I(0) 
Table 1.1 
 
In table 1.2 below we see that both the S&P 500 and FTSE 100 have one unit root in 
their movements since October 2007, which indicates that they are stationary series. 
 
Variable ADF-test 5%--CV Conclusion
ln(SP500_new) -1.980669 -3.414282 I(1) 
∆ln(sp500_new) -25.96323 -2.864199 I(0) 
ln(ftse_new) -2.476288 -3.414273 I(1) 
∆ln(ftse_new) -24.75911 -2.864199 I(0) 
Table 1.2 
 
When testing the residual of the two series we see that there is one unit root. The 
existence of this unit root shows that the series are not cointegrated, meaning that we 
must utilize the VAR model.  
    
Variable ADF-test 5%--CV Conclusion
resid02_new -2.861548 -3.414287 I(1) 
Table 1.3 
 
3. VAR model Optimal Lag Selection 
The first thing to consider when utilizing the VAR model is selecting the optimal lag 
order criteria. The optimal lag is the lag that generates the lowest AIC score. From 
the table below we see that lag 2 is the optimal lag for the data from 2003 to 2007. 
Lag 2 generates an AIC score of -14.34471. 
 Lag FPE AIC 
0  2.46e-09 -14.14681 
1  2.03e-09 -14.34081 
2   2.02e-09*  -14.34471* 
3  2.02e-09 -14.34204 
4  2.03e-09 -14.33847 
5  2.03e-09 -14.33834 
 Lag FPE AIC 
6  2.04e-09 -14.33657 
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 Lag FPE AIC 
7  2.05e-09 -14.33188 
8  2.06e-09 -14.32642 
 
Table 2.1 
 
The optimal lag for the data during the crisis, from 2007 to 2011, is lag 7. It 
generates an AIC score of -11.47958. 
 Lag FPE AIC 
0  5.58e-08 -11.02641 
1  3.83e-08 -11.40330 
2  3.65e-08 -11.44930 
3  3.60e-08 -11.46429 
4  3.60e-08 -11.46303 
5  3.57e-08 -11.47322 
6  3.56e-08 -11.47564 
7   3.54e-08*  -11.47958* 
8  3.56e-08 -11.47435 
Table 2.2 
 
It is interesting to note the difference in the optimal lags in the two data sets. This 
difference is most likely the result of both the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100 being non-
stationary series. 
 
4. Granger causality tests 
For each respective time period, we must first update the VAR models for their 
respective optimal lag lengths. This will allow us to conduct the Granger causality 
test. This test aids us in determining whether the S&P 500 movement causes the 
FTSE 100 movement and vice versa. 
 
From the results shown in table 3.1 we see that the S&P 500 was not caused by the 
FTSE 100 during the sample time period. This result is in contrast to the result 
showing that the movements in the FTSE 100 were caused by the movements in the 
S&P 500. Note the extremely low probability, which indicates that the S&P 500 is 
statistically significant to the FTSE 100, meeting our 5% significance threshold. 
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 12/08/11   Time: 13:49  
Sample: 10/01/2003 10/31/2007  
Included observations: 1008  
Dependent variable: DLNSP500_OLD  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DFTSE_OLD  1.204498 2  0.5476 
All  1.204498 2  0.5476 
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Dependent variable: DFTSE_OLD  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DLNSP500_OL
D  131.6368 2  0.0000 
All  131.6368 2  0.0000 
Table 3.1 
 
The above results are contrasted against table 3.2 below. An interesting difference is 
how closely related that the S&P 500’s movements are to the FTSE 100’s movements. 
Although, the S&P 500 is not caused by the movements in the FTSE 100’s 
movements at the 5% significance level, as a dependent variable it is much more 
closely related to the FTSE 100 after the October 2007 peak. A similarity between 
the two time periods is that probability in regards to the FTSE 100 as the dependent 
variable. This indicates that the FTSE 100 still appears to be affected by the S&P 500 
movements. 
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 12/08/11   Time: 15:53  
Sample: 11/01/2007 11/30/2011  
Included observations: 1002  
    
Dependent variable: DLNSP500_NEW  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DFTSE_NEW  12.84602 7  0.0760 
All  12.84602 7  0.0760 
    
Dependent variable: DFTSE_NEW  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
DLNSP500_NE
W  182.0544 7  0.0000 
All  182.0544 7  0.0000 
Table 3.2 
 
5. Impulse Response 
The goal of conducting the impulse response is to see the reaction of the market to 
various shocks. In the figure 2.1 below, we see the response of the S&P to shocks in 
the index (top left graph). From the graph we can see that the market quickly 
processes information, might go slightly negative for a short period before resettling 
at its new equilibrium. In the top right graph, we see the reaction of the S&P to 
shocks in the FTSE 100. It is clear that the S&P 500 has very little reaction to shocks 
in the FTSE 100.  
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It is interesting to note the FTSE 100’s reaction to shocks in the S&P 500 (bottom 
left). From the graph, we see that the FTSE 100 drops about half as much as the S&P 
500 but takes the same amount of time for the market to process the information. The 
FTSE 100 has a much more significant reaction to shocks in itself (bottom right). It 
might be vulnerable to more panic than the S&P 500. The FTSE 100 appears to drop 
falls into the negative when reacting to shocks before it slightly over-corrects and 
then resettles at its new equilibrium.  
 
Figure 2.1 
 
In figure 2.2 we see the two indices reactions to shocks since the financial crisis. It 
appears that there is a stronger cyclical effect on the S&P 500 when it is processing 
shocks since October 2007. After the peak, the S&P 500 drops by over twice as much 
as it did before the crisis, meaning that investors in the market react more strongly to 
shocks. This is coupled by a longer series of peaks and valleys as the market seems 
to correct and re-correct, not settling on an equilibrium point. Since the crisis, the 
S&P 500 also has a slightly larger reaction to shocks in the FTSE 100 and it also 
takes a longer time to process the shock (top right graph). This activity can be tied to 
the S&P 500’s reaction to its own shocks in that investors are generally unsure of 
how to react in the longer term, even if they efficiently process most of the effect of 
the shock very quickly. 
 
Since the crisis, the FTSE 100 reacts more strongly to shocks in the S&P 500 
(bottom left). However, this is coupled with the shock also being processed more 
slowly. Investors in the FTSE 100 are having similar reactions to these shocks as 
investors in the S&P 500; they seem unable to quickly settle the marketplace into a 
new equilibrium point. A surprising issue is that although the FTSE 100 has been 
taking longer to process shocks in the S&P 500 it appears able to quickly and more 
strongly respond to shocks in the FTSE 100 itself (bottom right). This willingness to 
quickly and strongly respond to shocks in the FTSE 100 is producing an even 
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stronger uncertainty once the shock has been introduced into the system. Before the 
crisis, the FTSE 100 reacted to shocks and quickly returned to its equilibrium. Since 
the crisis, the FTSE 100 reacts more strongly but then is unable to return to 
equilibrium. 
 
Figure 2.2 
 
6. Variance Decomposition 
Table 4.1 below shows us that the FTSE 100 has a very strong effect on the 
movements of the S&P 500. On day 1, we see that the FTSE 100 has no impact on 
the S&P 500, that is the S&P is 100% independent. After day 2 we see a slight 
impact on the S&P’s movements from the FTSE 100. The FTSE 100’s impact on the 
S&P 500 peaks at day 7 and remains constant thereafter at a level of causing 
0.113870% of the movements in the S&P 500. This level of impact is so small as to 
be insignificant. 
 
In contrast, we see that the S&P 500 initially has a relatively large impact on the 
movements in the FTSE 100. From day 1 we see that movements in the FTSE 100 
are 26.22055% caused by the movements in the S&P 500. We see this effect increase 
until it peaks at day 7 where it causes 29.17873% of the movements in the FTSE 100. 
This impact is significantly greater than the force that the FTSE 100 exerts on the 
S&P 500. 
 
 Variance 
Decomposition of 
DLNSP500_OLD    
Period S.E. DLNSP500_OLD DFTSE_OLD 
 1  0.007228  100.0000  0.000000 
 2  0.007253  99.99893  0.001074 
 3  0.007265  99.90032  0.099684 
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 Variance 
Decomposition of 
DLNSP500_OLD    
Period S.E. DLNSP500_OLD DFTSE_OLD 
 4  0.007267  99.88629  0.113715 
 5  0.007267  99.88627  0.113731 
 6  0.007267  99.88614  0.113855 
 7  0.007267  99.88613  0.113870 
 8  0.007267  99.88613  0.113870 
 9  0.007267  99.88613  0.113870 
 10  0.007267  99.88613  0.113870 
 Variance 
Decomposition of
DFTSE_OLD:    
 Period S.E. DLNSP500_OLD DFTSE_OLD 
 1  0.007186  26.22055  73.77945 
 2  0.007665  28.89172  71.10828 
 3  0.007691  29.16399  70.83601 
 4  0.007692  29.17147  70.82853 
 5  0.007693  29.17845  70.82155 
 6  0.007693  29.17871  70.82129 
 7  0.007693  29.17873  70.82127 
 8  0.007693  29.17873  70.82127 
 9  0.007693  29.17873  70.82127 
 10  0.007693  29.17873  70.82127 
Table 4.1 
 
The variance decomposition in table 4.2 below reveals fairly similar results for the 
S&P 500 after the crisis. Initially, at day 1, we see that the S&P 500’s movements are 
100% independent of the FTSE 100. However, starting on day 2, the movements in 
the S&P 500 are slightly the result of the FTSE 100. We see that the FTSE’s 
influence grows over the ten day span. This influence peaks at day 10 where the 
FTSE 100 causes 1.300421% of the movements in the S&P 500. 
 
 Variance 
Decomposition of
DLNSP500_NEW:    
 Period S.E. DLNSP500_NEWDFTSE_NEW 
 1  0.017957  100.0000  0.000000 
 2  0.018100  99.95613  0.043867 
 3  0.018157  99.83832  0.161681 
 4  0.018175  99.83722  0.162776 
 5  0.018178  99.83515  0.164847 
 6  0.018227  99.65518  0.344818 
 7  0.018249  99.57943  0.420573 
 8  0.018332  98.79413  1.205869 
 9  0.018352  98.69962  1.300379 
 10  0.018352  98.69958  1.300421 
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 Variance 
Decomposition of
DFTSE_NEW:    
 Period S.E. DLNSP500_NEWDFTSE_NEW 
 1  0.015101  53.18750  46.81250 
 2  0.016306  52.24894  47.75106 
 3  0.016431  52.91806  47.08194 
 4  0.016461  52.74527  47.25473 
 5  0.016480  52.66604  47.33396 
 6  0.016528  52.38827  47.61173 
 7  0.016578  52.53850  47.46150 
 8  0.016601  52.49465  47.50535 
 9  0.016620  52.40015  47.59985 
 10  0.016629  52.39274  47.60726 
Table 4.2 
 
Table 4.2 above, also reveals a surprising fact. Thus far, both of the indices begin 
with their largest impact on their movements and the other index slowly grows 
before plateauing in its influence on the opposing index. Since the crisis, we see the 
opposite effect occurring on the FTSE 100. At day 1, a majority of the movements in 
the FTSE 100 are actually the result of movements in the S&P 500. The S&P 500’s 
influence peaks at 53.1875% at day 1 and slowly decreases over the following days. 
Its lowest impact on the FTSE 100 occurs on day 10 at 52.39274%. This means that 
although the S&P 500’s influence slowly declines over the course of the observed 
period it remains the major influence on the FTSE 100.   
 
6. Results 
1. Hypotheses results: S&P 500’s influence on the FTSE 100 
 
H0: The S&P 500 exerted a greater influence on the FTSE 100 after its peak in 
October 2007. 
 
HA: The S&P 500 exerted the same or less influence on the FTSE 100 after its peak 
in October 2007. 
 
The Granger causality test indicated that the S&P 500 had a high significance level in 
regards to its influence on the FTSE 100 both before and after the October 2007 peak 
of the S&P 500. The S&P 500 met both a 1% and 5% threshold and thus it can be 
concluded that the S&P 500’s influence is and has been significant on the FTSE 100. 
Since the results of the Granger causality indicated an identical significance level it is 
difficult to utilize it in the assessment of the growth in the S&P 500’s influence on 
the FTSE 100. These results force us to rely on the variance decomposition to 
evaluate our hypotheses. 
 
In table 4.1 we saw the percentage of the FTSE 100’s movements, up to the peak in 
October 2007, that were a result of the S&P 500’s influence. Over the 10 day 
observed period the S&P 500’s influence peaked at 29.17873%. This means that up 
until its peak in October 2007 the S&P 500 caused almost 30% of the movement in 
the FTSE 100. Table 4.2 revealed the impact the S&P 500 had on the FTSE 100 after 
the peak. This revealed to us that the impact of the S&P 500 has in fact, increased 
11
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since its peak in October 2007. Since the peak, the S&P 500 has caused up to 
53.1875% of the movements in the FTSE 100. That means that a majority of the 
movements in the FTSE 100 are a direct result of movements in the S&P 500. 
 
Based on these results we can accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative 
hypothesis. The S&P 500’s impact on the FTSE 100 has dramatically increased since 
its peak in October 2007. 
 
2. Secondary Results: FTSE 100 Influence on the S&P 500 
 
Our observed tests indicated that the FTSE 100 had very little impact on the S&P 
500 before the crisis. The Granger causality test did not show any significant 
influence on the S&P 500 from the FTSE 100. Graphing the impulse response of the 
S&P 500 to the FTSE 100 appeared to confirm these results. The results of the 
variance decomposition suggested that the FTSE 100 was a minor influence on the 
S&P 500. It stated that the FTSE’s influence on the S&P 500 peaked at causing 
0.11387% of the movements in the S&P 500. From these results, we can conclude 
that the FTSE 100 had almost no influence on the S&P 500 before its peak in 
October 2007. 
 
After the peak of October 2007, the Granger causality test showed that the FTSE 
100’s influence may have increased but it still did not meet our 5% threshold. Thus, 
its influence has remained statistically insignificant. The impulse response followed 
this point by indicating there might have been some force exerted on the S&P 500, 
albeit minor. In table 4.2 we saw that the influence on the S&P 500 by the FTSE 100 
had increased. Based on the results of the variance decomposition we saw the 
FTSE’s influence over the S&P increase to 1.300421%. 
 
7. Limitations 
Due to insufficient time, the paper was not as in depth as originally planned. 
Originally, it was the researcher’s intention to compare more US indices across a 
larger variety of global indices. It is believed that with more time, a global 
perspective could have been attained in order to achieve a more complete picture of 
the interconnectivity of equity indices. This will be a subject matter that the 
researcher will return to so that he may gain a better perspective on the linkage 
between international financial markets. 
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